The General Electric Company (GE) End Game: Bataan Death March or Turnaround Play?

1. Break it up: If GE at its peak represented the glory of conglomerates, its current plight is a sign of how far conglomerates have fallen in the world. Across the world, multi business companies are finding themselves under pressure to break up and in many cases, their stockholders will be better off if they do. To gain from a break up, though, here are some of the things that have to be true.

– Separable businesses: The different businesses have to be separable, since leakages and synergies across businesses can make it more difficult to cleave off pieces to sell or spin off. On this count, GE is probably on safe ground, since its businesses (other than GE Capital) are self standing, for the most part, with little in terms of cross business effects.

– Willing buyers: There have to be potential buyers who are willing to pay prices for the pieces that exceed what they will generate as value for the holding company, as going concerns, and those higher prices either have to come from potential synergies or changed management. None of GE’s businesses seem alluring enough to attract multiple bidders, willing to pay premium prices, and given GE’s shaky bargaining position, it is more likely than not that a rush to unload businesses will do more harm than good.

– Corporate Waste (at HQ): A large chunk of the corporate overhead has to viewed as wasteful, with a big drop in corporate expenses accompanying the breakup. How much of the corporate expense of $3.8 billion that GE reported in 2017 is wasteful and could be eliminated with targeted cost cuts? Looking at the breakdown of these expenses, just about $2.2 billion in for covering pension obligations and breaking up the company will not relieve the company of its contractual obligations. Some of the remaining $1.6 billion may be fat that can be cut, but even cutting the entire amount (which would be a tall order) will not turn the company around.

Since GE will be trying to sell these businesses to buyers today, this is a pricing and not a valuation exercise, and I have estimate a pricing for GE’s businesses below, using an EBITDA recomputed using the average operating margin in each business over the last five years to compute operating income and allocating corporate expenses to the divisions, based upon revenues. To convert the EBITDA to an estimated value, I used the EV/EBITDA multiples of the peer group:
If GE is able to get buyers to pay industry-level multiples of EBITDA for each of these businesses, it will be able to net about $103 billion for its equity investors, higher than the market capitalization on November 14 of $72 billion. The problem, though, is that fire sales of entire companies almost never deliver the expected proceeds, as buyers, recognizing desperation, hold back. In fact, GE’s attempts to extricate itself from a portion of its Baker-Hughes investment in the last few days show that these sales will occur at a discount.
2. Retrench and Reshape: The second choice for GE is to retrench and perhaps renew itself, not as a growth company, but as a stable, high margin company in businesses where it has a competitive advantage. In broad terms, the roadmap for GE to succeed in this path is a simple one, shrinking or selling off pieces of its low-margin businesses, exiting the capital business and consolidating its presence in the aviation, healthcare and transportation businesses. To get a better sense of what the businesses would be worth, as continuing operations, I valued each of GE’s business, using simplistic assumptions: I used the sector cost of capital for each business, set growth in the next five years equal to revenue growth in each of GE’s businesses in the last five years and normalized operating income based upon the average operating margin that each of GE’s businesses have delivered over the last five years:
The value that I derive for equity is lower than the $103 billion that I estimated in the last section, but it does not require any near term fire sales at discounts. There are two big challenges that GE will face along the way. The first is that GE is saddled with a significant debt obligation, a legacy of GE Capital, that will not fade away quickly, and the debt obligations represent a clear and present danger to the firm. One reason for the rapid drop in GE’s stock price in the last few weeks has been the deterioration in the company’s credit standing, as can be seen in the rising default spreads for the company in the CDS market.
The reason that GE is trying to sell some of its stake in Baker and Hughes to pay down debt, but bond markets are skeptical, with good reason. The second is that GE Capital is now more burden than benefit to investors. In the valuation table, note that the value that I have estimated for GE Capital’s operations ($27 billion) is much lower than GE Capital debt ($51 billion); in fact, I derive very similar results in the pricing. Put differently, in my valuation, I foresee the cost of exiting GE capital to be $24 billion in today’s terms, but spread out over time. If GE can navigate its way through its debt payments to becoming a more focused company, with constrained ambitions, it could survive and reclaim its place as a holding for a conservative value investor.
3. Reincarnate (or the Bataan Death March): There is a third option that GE shareholders have to hope and pray that GE does not take, where the company tries to recapture its old glory, throwing caution to the winds and reinvesting large amounts in new businesses, or worse still, large acquisitions. While there is no indication that Larry Culp, GE’s new CEO, has grandiose plans for the company, that may be because the company is in crisis today. If as the crisis passes, Culp is tempted to make himself the second coming of Jack Welch, the company will follow the path of other aging companies that refuse to act their age, spending billions on cosmetic surgery (acquisitions) before finally capitulating. If there is a role model that Mr. Culp should follow, it is less that of Steve the Visionary, and more that of Larry the Liquidator.