Investors want yield, and banks want to give it to them. There’s nothing wrong with that, usually — except when investor demand begins to sway lenders into making riskier loans to bundle and sell as securities. This is exactly what seems to be happening, as commercial lending is hitting the big time, even to the extent of basing several investment instruments on a single commercial loan.
Similarly, leveraged loans are hot these days, as well. As in the days before the crisis, the riskiest loans create the highest yield, and competition spawns a reduction in the protections, or covenants, that are customarily placed on these loans to protect the lender — and, by extension, the investor.
Should the return of these covenant-lite loans be a red flag for investors, or, as some say, are they actually much safer than they are made out to be?
Moody’s sounds the alarm
Last month, Moody’s released a report that purported that cov-lite loans might cause investors distress in the event of an economic downturn, primarily because of the lender’s inability to prod distressed companies into restructuring in the absence of such a covenant. This coincides with a rash of cov-lite loans being extended to companies in dubious financial health, which could be adversely affected by higher interest rates.
There’s no doubt that the volume of these loans has risen dramatically. The highest recorded was in 2007, with volume of $96.6 billion; in April, Forbes noted that this year’s volume had already reached $93.5 billion. While this high-speed production is eye-popping, does it really translate into higher risk?
Recovery rates are historically high
While you might assume that a clause giving a lender the right to step in and force changes to a floundering company would be protective, some analysts disagree. Felix Salmon does a dandy job of explaining how these loans outgrew the small-town banker and business-owner handshake deals of yesteryear and developed into the high-flying financial instruments they are today. But, while covenants evolved to supplant the earlier word-of-honor method of loaning money, Salmon argues that forcing a company to restructure when it is unnecessary is not helpful. In fact, doing so could ostensibly push a borrower into default, when butting out would have allowed the company to right itself in its own time.