13D Filing: JANA Partners and EQT Corp (EQT)

If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Schedule
13G to report the acquisition that is the subject of this Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of Rule 13d-1(e), 13d-1(f)
or 13d-1(g), check the following box. [ ]

NOTE: Schedules filed in paper format shall include a signed
original and five copies of the schedule, including all exhibits. See Rule 13d-7 for other parties to whom copies are to be sent.

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The information required on the remainder of this cover page shall
not be deemed to be “filed” for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) or
otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act but shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however,
see the Notes).

This Amendment No. 4 (“Amendment No.4“) amends
and supplements the statement on Schedule 13D filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC“) on
July 3, 2017 (the “Original Schedule 13D“), as amended by Amendment No. 1 filed with the SEC on July 5, 2017 (“Amendment
No. 1“), Amendment No. 2 filed with the SEC on July 31, 2017 (“Amendment No. 2“) and Amendment No. 3
filed with the SEC on August 14, 2017 (“Amendment No. 3“, and together with the Original Schedule 13D, Amendment
No. 1, Amendment No. 2 and this Amendment No. 4, the “Schedule 13D“) with respect to the shares (“Shares“)
of common stock, no par value, of EQT Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation (the “Issuer“). Capitalized terms
used herein and not otherwise defined in this Amendment No. 4 shall have the meanings set forth in the Schedule 13D. This Amendment
No. 4 amends Items 4 and 7 as set forth below.

Item 4 of the Schedule 13D is hereby amended
and supplemented by the addition of the following:

On September 20, 2017, JANA sent a letter to the
Issuer attached hereto as Exhibit J and incorporated herein by reference.

Item 7 of the Schedule 13D is being amended
and supplemented by the addition of the following:

SIGNATURES

After reasonable inquiry and to the best
of my knowledge and belief, each of the undersigned certifies that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete
and correct.

Dated: September 20, 2017

EXHIBIT J

September 20, 2017

Board of Directors (the “Board”)
EQT Corporation
625 Liberty Avenue, Suite 1700
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

Ladies & Gentlemen,

JANA Partners LLC (“we”
or “us”) and the industry experts with whom we have invested together own almost 6% of the outstanding shares of
EQT Corporation (“EQT” or the “Company”).  As you know, we believe that EQT should address
its substantial sum of the parts discount by immediately committing to a spinoff of its midstream business, and that
EQT’s decision to pursue an overpriced and dilutive acquisition of Rice Energy (“Rice”) rather than committing
to a separation now risks forsaking substantial shareholder value. In response to mounting shareholder pressure to address
its sum of the parts discount, EQT announced last week that the Board would convene a committee of independent directors
after the Rice transaction closes which would finalize a plan to address EQT’s undervaluation by March 31^st,
2018. However, there is no conceivable justification for the Board to drag its feet this long to even start its work and no
excuse for asking shareholders to keep waiting for the Company to finally take the only logical step to resolve its
persistent sum of the parts discount.

EQT has had more than enough time to
evaluate its options to maximize value, given that management has been discussing EQT’s substantial stock market discount for
years. Likewise, before approving a massive equity issuance as part of the proposed Rice acquisition, the full Board should
have thoroughly studied all available paths to value creation, including a separation. We also see no reason why shareholders
should be asked to first vote on the Rice acquisition and trust that the Board will successfully address EQT’s undervaluation
afterwards. In fact, the more work we do, the more troubling the Board’s prioritization of the Rice acquisition over
addressing EQT’s undervaluation becomes, as the synergy arguments offered by EQT to support the Rice acquisition continue to
crumble, EQT’s excuses for delaying an announcement with respect to a separation are exposed as hollow, and EQT’s prior
acquisition history makes clear that shareholders have no reason to take the leap of faith that EQT now asks.

Crumbling Synergies. We have
already argued that the originally-stated $2.5 billion in synergies EQT has claimed will result from the Rice transaction are likely
overstated by as much as $1.3 billion (and that the $7.5 billion in possible additional synergies which management claimed to have
somehow discovered after we announced our opposition to the transaction, but refused to commit to being worth anything, likely
are in fact worth nothing). It now appears that the original synergies may have been even more grossly exaggerated than we first
believed.

With the help of a leading petroleum
engineering firm with extensive experience in the Appalachian basin and experienced industry operators, we have identified
and mapped out every existing and potential future well location on the combined company’s acreage based upon
publicly-available data, assuming 750 foot spacing in Washington County and, even more generously, 500 foot spacing in Greene
County.  Based on this work, we believe it would be impossible for EQT to support its claimed synergy drilling plan of
1,200 wells with 12,000 feet in average lateral length.  While the over-simplified maps provided in EQT’s presentations
make the synergy claims seem plausible, a detailed analysis reveals that much of the acreage actually consists of hundreds of
disjointed blocks that are not properly depicted in
management’s map. Moreover, many of the larger blocks of adjacent acres (that in theory would enable longer laterals) have
already been drilled out at least on one side. There is simply not enough undrilled contiguous acreage blocks to enable such
a dramatic improvement in lateral length over what can be accomplished by each company on a standalone basis.

Based on our analysis, we believe a combination
with Rice would only modestly increase average lateral lengths by less than 1,000 feet, not the 4,000 feet increase claimed by
EQT. This modest increase in lateral length would result in approximately $300 million in pre-tax capital savings on a net present
value basis, not the $1.9 billion EQT has claimed. This means that the lateral length drilling synergy benefit to legacy EQT shareholders
of a Rice transaction, which is the crux of EQT’s rationale for this deal, would amount to only approximately $200 million
(given that current EQT shareholders will own 65% of the combined company). Adding this approximately $200 million in drilling
synergy to EQT shareholders’ 65% share of the $600 million in pre-tax synergies from G&A reduction, which amounts to
$390 million, results in a total of approximately $590 million of synergies, despite EQT shareholders paying an acquisition premium
to Rice shareholders of $1.8 billion. In fact, given the massive disparity between EQT’s claims and what our analysis reveals,
we are forced to question whether the Board conducted adequate diligence before approving this transaction.

Hollow Arguments for Delaying
Addressing Sum of the Parts Discount. We understand that EQT management in lobbying for the Rice acquisition has
been suggesting to shareholders that they are unable to commit to a spinoff of the midstream business now before
closing the Rice acquisition without triggering a $500 million tax liability, thus supposedly justifying delaying an
announcement until after the acquisition is completed. This argument, however, runs directly counter to management’s prior
assertion that EQT does not have to tax adjust any of the expected deal synergies because they will be shielded from taxes by
intangible drilling costs (IDC). If this is true, then EQT should be able to shield much if not all of the tax liabilities
arising from announcing a separation prior to closing the Rice acquisition. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that these tax
liabilities would be avoided by waiting to make an announcement until March 31, 2018. Management’s gamesmanship regarding
both the timing and steps to be taken to address the sum of parts discount should give serious pause to any shareholder
considering supporting the Rice acquisition on the hope that EQT will in fact commit to an immediate separation after its
acquisition closes.

History of Value-Destroying Acquisitions
and Strategic Ineptitude. Our review of EQT’s prior acquisition history makes clear that shareholders should be very wary
of promises made by EQT management with respect to capital allocation strategy.

• We estimate EQT destroyed hundreds of millions of dollars of value in the 2014 cash/asset swap
  to acquire Permian acreage that the Company has subsequently suspended operations on and is now trying to exit, due
  to poor returns.
• EQT expended $1.6 billion in 2016 and 2017 for West Virginia
  acreage that the Company now deems unattractive due to permitting issues that were known
  at the time of these deals.
• EQT spent approximately $280 million in 2010 to acquire acreage in Cameron, Clearfield, Elk and
  Jefferson Counties in Pennsylvania that is no longer an area of focus for the Company.
• EQT passed on acquiring Alpha Natural Resources, Vantage
  Energy and Lola Energy, all of which were then acquired by Rice and which collectively accounted for approximately 75% of Rice’s
  market cap at the time the proposed acquisition of Rice by EQT was announced. Rice acquired these companies at a lower price than
  EQT now proposes to pay to acquire them within Rice. So not only did EQT pass on acquiring Rice last year at a cheaper price,
  it passed on the chance to acquire the assets that comprise the bulk of Rice’s value at far lower prices.
• As noted in our earlier letters, EQT has repeatedly issued equity at a substantial
  discount to its sum of the parts value. 

In short, the questions about why EQT is pushing shareholders to approve the Rice transaction before the Company
addresses its substantial market undervaluation keep multiplying, and in each case EQT’s response is wholly lacking. As we previously
noted, EQT’s management compensation policy incentivizing production growth by any means, including dilutive and overpriced acquisitions,
provides the most plausible explanation. While EQT last week promised to revise its management compensation structure in response
to this criticism, the time to make this change was before EQT agreed to an acquisition that delivers increased production growth
at an exorbitant cost and little else, and we believe the Board’s failure to address EQT’s warped incentive policy until the Company
was forced to do so indicates serious governance problems on the Board.

For these reasons, we continue to believe that
EQT should commit immediately to a separation, to occur promptly after the Rice acquisition if it is approved and immediately after
the vote if shareholders reject the acquisition, as we believe they should. Given EQT’s shifting and easily-disproven arguments
for the Rice acquisition, the Board’s long-running failure to take aggressive action to address its undervaluation, and the governance
issues we have identified, we also continue to believe that it may be necessary to bring in new directors who have made substantial
investments in EQT stock and will do a better job pursuing maximum value creation.  Should you wish to discuss this matter
further, we can be reached at (212) 455-0900.

Sincerely,

 /s/ Barry Rosenstein

Barry Rosenstein
Managing Partner
JANA Partners LLC